

Models-as-usual for unusual risks?  
On the value of catastrophic climate change

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# About the talk

The presentation:

- is based on a paper written with Bruno Lanz (Graduate Institute, Geneva, and ETH Zurich) and Stéphane Zuber (CNRS and ETH Zurich). The paper is targeted to an economic journal.
- emphasizes the motivation for such a paper.
- gives an overview of the main findings.
- will not present the model in details.

# Outline of the presentation

- The standard approach in climate change economics (Stern review, Nordhaus DICE model, etc.)
- New aspects coming from climate science (irreversibilities, non linearities, tipping points)
- Is the standard approach still adapted?
  - The assumption of temporal risk neutrality.
  - Maintaining temporal risk neutrality while considering the risk of irreversible damages?
- Another approach assuming temporal risk aversion.
- Overview of how the models with/without temporal risk aversion compare:
  - when considering that there is no endogenous risk of irreversible change.
  - when endogenous climate change may lead to irreversible damages.
- Concluding remarks

## The standard approach - principles

- The economic literature on climate change has mostly considered climate policy as a consumption/investment problem.
- How much should we invest now to mitigate climate change, knowing that what is not done today should be done tomorrow?
- This is a problem of intertemporal allocation of resources.
- The time discounting parameter was shown to play a key role.
- Many contributions debate about the right values of the discount rate, and how it should be modified to account for uncertainty.
- The structure of the model itself is not challenged.

# The standard approach - formalization


- The society aims at maximizing an intertemporal objective given by

$$E\left[\sum_{t=0}^{+\infty} \beta^t u(x_t)\right]$$

where  $x_t$  is a variable (or a vector of variables) -most often consumption- that determines the happiness of agents alive in period  $t$ .

- There is a technology ("investment") which makes it possible to transfer resources from time  $t$  to time  $t + 1$ .
- The role of climate is most often embedded in the technology. Investing in climate mitigation today makes it possible to use more efficient technology later on.
- A very simple extension to the standard Ramsey growth model, with specific technological constraints related to the climate.

# Climate sensitivity is highly uncertain



With feedbacks,  $\text{prob}(\Delta T > 20^{\circ}\text{C}) = 0.01$  (see Weitzman, 2009)

# Non-linear climate system

- Non-marginal and irreversible impacts (Lenton and Ciscar, 2012). Tipping-points (e.g. arctic ice melting).
- Preventive measures that could be taken today may no longer be available in the future (Sterner and Persson, 2008)
- Society faces a trade-off between consumption and the risk of an irreversible change.
- The problem is no longer that of intertemporal allocation of resources, but to evaluate the willingness to pay for risk reduction (Weitzmann, 2009).
- Risk aversion becomes a key aspect (Bommier and Villeneuve, 2012).

# Temporal risk neutrality

- Expectation is a linear operator

$$E[a\tilde{X} + b\tilde{Y}] = aE[\tilde{X}] + bE[\tilde{Y}]$$

- Thus

$$E\left[\sum_{t=0}^{+\infty} \beta^t u(x_t)\right] = \sum_{t=0}^{+\infty} \beta^t E[u(x_t)]$$

- The correlation between what happens at different time periods does not matter.
- However, in case of durable consequences -and in particular irreversible damages- what happens at different time periods is strongly positively correlated.
- Question: How is the analysis modified if correlation aversion is assumed?



## A model with temporal risk aversion

- One may consider agents that are more risk averse than in the standard model.
- Within the expected utility framework, that involves considering the objective given by:

$$E\left[\phi\left(\sum_{t=0}^{+\infty} \beta^t u(x_t)\right)\right]$$

where  $\phi$  is an increasing and concave function.

- In the paper, we will focus on the case where  $\phi(x) = \frac{1-e^{-\varepsilon x}}{\varepsilon}$  and take  $\beta = 1$  to assume preference stationarity.
- In contradistinction with the standard approach, we do not assume exogenous time preferences. Time discounting will however arise from the combination of the risk of having irreversible changes and risk aversion.

# Problem

A single problem of growth with pollution and a risk of society's collapse:

- The society can produce using more or less polluting technologies.
- Polluting technologies are cheaper.
- There is a risk of collapse, that depends on accumulated pollution.
- Post collapse trajectories are exogenous.

# The economy: a standard neoclassical growth model

- Output is a function of capital and technology  $z_t \in [0, 1]$ :

$$y_t = z_t f(k_t), \quad f' > 0, \quad f'' < 0$$

- Output can be consumed  $c_t$  or invested in  $k_t$

$$\dot{k}_t = z_t f(k_t) - c_t - \delta k_t$$

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- The rate of emissions per unit of output is a function of  $z_t$ :

$$E_t = \varphi(z_t) f(k_t), \quad \varphi' > 0, \quad \varphi'' > 0$$

- Emissions accumulate into a stock:

$$\dot{M}_t = E_t - \psi M_t = \varphi(z_t) f(k_t) - \psi M_t$$

In each period, the risk of catastrophic collapse is a function of the emissions stock (Cropper, 1976; Tsur and Zemel 1996, 1998)

- Hazard rate  $\mu_t = \mu(M_t)$ ,  $\mu' > 0$
- After a collapse, the economy follows an exogenous trajectory.
- Post-collapse welfare is equivalent to the welfare associated with consuming  $\underline{c}$  for ever.
- The nature of the collapse makes it impossible to invest for post-collapse welfare.

→ Reduce emissions/risk through  $z_t$  or  $k_t$ , trading-off with output / consumption.

# Objectives

Two possible models of social objectives:

- The standard additive model assuming temporal risk neutrality and positive time preference:

$$E\left[\sum_{t=0}^{+\infty} \beta^t u(x_t)\right]$$

- The multiplicative model assuming temporal risk aversion and no time preference:

$$\frac{1 - E\left[\exp\left(-\varepsilon \left(\sum_{t=0}^{+\infty} u(x_t)\right)\right)\right]}{\varepsilon}$$

- Note: these classes of models intersect for  $\beta = 1$  and  $\varepsilon = 0$ .

# Analysis

- Analytical resolution for steady states.
- Numerical solutions for non steady-states trajectories.
- Comparison of both models when the collapse risk is exogenous.
- Comparison of both models when the collapse risk is endogenous.

## Results under the assumption of an exogenous collapse risk

- When the risk of collapse is considered as exogenous, then both models look very similar.
- It's actually possible to calibrate both models to generate exactly the same steady state (same interest rate, etc.)
- Both models react in very similar ways to changes in productivity.
- These are two possible candidates to rationalize what we call a Business-as-Usual-Economy (an economy with no endogenous climate risk).



## Results under the assumption of an endogenous collapse risk


- When the risk of collapse is considered as endogenous then the multiplicative model recommends a stronger climate mitigation than the additive model.
- Both models get very close when  $\beta \simeq 1$  and  $\varepsilon \simeq 0$ . They predict then a low interest rate and significant climate mitigation (as in Stern's review).
- When models are calibrated to generate usual values for the rate of interest, the multiplicative model advises much greater mitigation than the additive one.
- With the multiplicative model, it is possible to simultaneously have significant time discounting and strong concerns for the climate.

# Numerical simulations


- The parameters of the model are calibrated to reproduce the dynamics of the DICE model by Nordhaus in absence of endogenous risks (no climate externalities)
- Social preferences:
  - Instantaneous utility function:  $u(c_t) = \frac{c_t^{1-\gamma} - \underline{c}^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}$
  - For both additive and multiplicative models, we calibrate  $\gamma = 2$  and set  $\underline{c} = 1$  (note:  $c_{2005} = 10$ )
  - In the additive model, we use  $\theta = 1.5\%$  as in DICE.
  - In the multiplicative model we calibrate  $\varepsilon$  such that both models admit the same steady state interest rate under BAU.

# Assuming an exogenous collapse risk $\mu_0$

## Consumption



## Capital stock




- Both models have very similar predictions
- Similar response to a TFP shock


## Assuming an endogenous risk

$$\text{Hazard rate: } \mu(M) = \mu_0 + \mu_1(M - \bar{M})^\sigma$$

Low risk schedule





High risk schedule





- High risk: A doubling of the stock reduces  $s_t$  by 3% after 100 years
- Low risk: A tripling of the stock reduces  $s_t$  by 3% after 1,000 years

# Optimal paths under endogenous catastrophic risk

## Additive model



## Multiplicative model



- Using alternative models equivalent to an increase of risk by a factor of 100

## Concluding remarks

- Different forms of social objectives -with or without temporal risk aversion - may lead to very similar predictions when ignoring endogenous climate risk.
- However, when an endogenous risk is introduced, temporal risk aversion becomes a crucial element.
- For a given level of time discounting, assuming temporal risk neutrality (as is usually done), rather than temporal risk aversion, was found to be roughly equivalent as underestimating the risk by a factor 100.
- **Key question:** Should we assume temporal risk aversion (also called preference for catastrophe avoidance) for social evaluation?

## Reformulating the question

- Assume that there is a disease that randomly kills individuals at age 20 with a probability of 1 %.
- Assume that someone invents a vaccine that prevents having this disease.
- You know that:
  - With a probability of 99.1 %, the vaccine is safe and efficient.
  - With a probability of 0.9 % it will kill for sure.

QUESTION: Do you give the vaccine to:

- the whole population?
- nobody?
- a fraction of the population?